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Lansing: Family Law - Does the Court Really Look out for the Best Interest

FAMILY LAW-Does the Court Really Look Out for the Best
Interest of the Child? Jurisdiction and the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act. Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo.
1998).
INTRODUCTION

Teresa A. Ostermiller and Scott Spurr, both of Lancaster, California, began a relationship in 1993 and had sexual intercourse.' After
becoming pregnant, Teresa moved to and became a resident of Gering,
Nebraska in August 1993.2 She called Spurr in California to inform him
that she was pregnant with his child.3 On May 1, 1994, Teresa gave birth
to a son, BRO, in Nebraska.4 Soon after the birth, Teresa called Spurr
and informed him that his son had been born.3 Spurr moved to Wyoming
sometime after the birth of BRO.6
Teresa was in need of financial assistance, and the Nebraska Department of Social Services provided her with Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Medicaid benefits. 7 This financial aid was
contingent on certain conditions. To receive AFDC and Medicaid benefits from Nebraska, Teresa had to sign a child support affidavit. 8 If
Teresa failed to cooperate, the agency threatened to discontinue the aid. 9
Teresa, a Nebraska resident, signed a Uniform Support Petition
1. Brief of Appellant at 2, Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1998) (No. C97-219) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Id. The Wyoming court uses initials to protect the child's confidentiality.
5.
Id.
6.
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 941. Spurr moved to Cheyenne, Wyoming, located in
the Southeast comer of the State in Laramie county. Id. The exact date of Spurr's move
is unknown.
7.
Id. AFDC "provide[s] assistance to needy families so that children may be cared
for in their own homes or homes of relatives." General Temporary Assistance For
Needy Families (TANF) Provision, 45 C.F.R. § 260.20(a) (2001).
8. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 3. A child support affidavit contains information about the child, mother and all alleged fathers, including when and where they had
intercourse and potential information that could be used to locate the father (addresses,
phone numbers, social security numbers). The affidavit is used by the child support
agency to locate alleged fathers to initiate paternity actions.
9.
Id.
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at the request of the Nebraska Department of Family Services.' ° Nebraska sent the petition to Wyoming to establish a Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act case." Spurr, who had not supported, visited or otherwise aided Teresa in caring for BRO, was served with and answered
the petition.' 2 Spurr, however, counter-petitioned, asking for the establishment of paternity, visitation, child support, tax exemption, and
change in BRO's birth certificate to reflect Spurr's surname.1 3 The counterclaim was unexpected, considering Spurr did not attempt to contact
BRO or Teresa prior to the filing of the paternity action. 4 Teresa responded to Spurr's counter-petition with a written objection to personal
jurisdiction regarding any matters in the counterclaim that did not pertain to the establishment of paternity and support for BRO.15
A court commissioner heard the Ostermiller case on April 23,
1997.6 Teresa and BRO were not present at the hearing, but the State of
Wyoming appeared as both a guardian
ad-litem for BRO and as a repre7
sentative of the State of Nebraska.'
Spurr and his wife attended the hearing and stated that Spurr was

10.
Id. at 1. A Uniform Support Petition states that the mother wants to petition the
state where the alleged father is located to establish paternity and child support. It is a
standard form that includes information such as the petitioner's name, responding state,
initiating state, what type of action (location only, establishment of paternity, child
support, medical coverage, modification, income withholding, collection of arrears,
enforcement of existing arrears, registration of a foreign support order, federal tax offset), absent parent information and a case summary if an order from a court already
exists. The petition is filed pursuant to the Uniform Intrastate Family Support Act (referred to as UIFSA). Office of Child Support Enforcement, United States Department of
Health and Human Services, UIFSA Handbook, 2-14. (1994) [hereinafter UIFSA Handbook].
11.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
12.
Id.
13.
Id. Scott Spurr did not visit BRO during the first three years of his life, including the eighteen months that he lived only one hundred miles from Gering, Nebraska,
because he said it was too far away. Id. at 2-3.
14.
Id.
15.
Id. at 3-4.
16.
Report of District Court Commissioner, Doc. 144 No. 181, First Judicial District, State of Wyoming, at 1. In Laramie County, Wyoming, most family law cases are
heard by a Court Commissioner and then a recommended order is sent to one of the two
district court judges to become a final court order.
17.
Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo. 1998). The State of Wyoming
represents the child and the initiating state but does not represent the mother or the
alleged father in the action. Generally, parents can obtain other counsel to represent
them in a UIFSA action. Teresa did not obtain private counsel in this UIFSA action
until the appeal process.
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capable of caring for the child. 8 Spurr's wife also testified that she was
highly supportive of Spurr's visitation request and also desired a relationship with the child. 9 The District Court Commissioner Report was
filed April 25, 1997.20 The report recommended to the district court that
it establish paternity, require Spurr to pay child and medical support,
reimburse Nebraska for past welfare benefits received by Teresa for
BRO, award custody to Teresa, provide Spurr with visitation rights, state
a provision for the change of BRO's surname, and give Spurr the federal
income tax dependence deduction. 2' The district court, on May 29, 1997,
entered a final order affirming all of the Commissioner's recommendations despite Teresa's objection to subject matter and personal jurisdiction."
On September 15, 1997, Teresa appealed the district court's order on the grounds that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction
to decide visitation and name change issues, or personal jurisdiction.2 3
During the appeal, Spurr failed to file a responding brief. However, the
State of Wyoming was "not in concert with [Teresa Ostermiller] in her
appeal of the action taken by the District Court" and filed a brief to uphold the district court holding. 24 The State of Wyoming, which represented BRO as his guardian at-litem in the district court action, now opposed Teresa and BRO in order to argue that the district court had jurisdiction over the visitation issues.25 On December 10, 1998, the Wyoming
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that Wyoming statutes confer subject matter and personal jurisdiction over all the
decided issues.26
This case note argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court failed in
two ways: (1) The court improperly interpreted and applied the Wyoming UIFSA statutes by granting both personal and subject matter juris18.
19.

Id.
Id.

20.
Id.
21.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
22.
Judgment and Order for Paternity and Support, Civil Action No. 144-181,
POSSE No. 80799, Filed May 29, 1997, Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo.
1998) [hereinafter Final Order].
23.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 2, at 1.
24.
Brief of Appellee at 2, Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1998) (No. 97219) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
25.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 22 at 2. The caption of the appellee's brief was
changed by the State of Wyoming to Teresa A. Ostermiller, and Brett Ostermiller, a
Minor, as the Appellants v. Scott Spurr, Appellee, and the State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, Appellee.
26.
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 944.
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diction over Teresa; and (2) the court failed to consider the best interests
of the child when reviewing the visitation and custody issues. The note
argues that the Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the intent of the Congress and the Wyoming Legislature and placed an innocent child in a
potentially harmful situation. The note will look at decisions prior to and

after Ostermillerfrom both Wyoming and other jurisdictions to show the
court failed to follow precedent. Additionally, the case note discusses
why the State of Wyoming maintained involvement in the appeal after
Spurr had withdrawn from the case.
BACKGROUND
URESA to UIFSA: Why and How UIFSA Became a Uniform Child Support Act
In the early 1900s, the United States was faced with persistent
problems associated with the failure of non-custodial parents to financially support their dependents. 27 These problems included a lack of legal guidelines and criminal or civil penalties for non-payment of support.2 8 In 1910 various state commissioners (legal and family law professionals appointed by Congress) addressed these problems by drafting the
Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act. 29 However, the act had two
serious deficiencies: (1) Enforcement was limited to imposing criminal

sanctions, and (2) the law did not address interstate situations. 30 In response to an increasingly mobile society, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA) was enacted in 1950. 31 URESA was
the first act that specifically addressed the issue of interstate enforce27.

UIFSA Handbook, supra note 10 at 1-1.
Id.
29.
Id. The Uniform Desertion and Non-Support Act provided for fine up to $500
and/or up to two years in prison if the husband deserted and failed to support the mother
and child. Unif. Desertion and Non-Support Act § 1, Martindale-Hubbell Law Digest
Uniform and Model Acts (2001). It allowed for a judge to order temporary and permanent support but only for in-state actions. It also allowed the court to order the husband
into hard labor and have the money he earned given directly to the mother and child. Id.
at §2.
30.
Office of Child Support Enforcement, United States Department of Health and
Human Services, Uniform Interstate Family Support Act Handbook, 1-1 (1994). Interstate situations include crossing state lines in order to gain jurisdiction over a noncustodial parent to determine paternity and child support as well as enforcement actions.
31.
Id. "In 1989, interstate child support cases made up approximately thirty percent of all child support cases, and an estimated 2.5 million noncustodial fathers were
nonresidents of the states in which their children lived." John Saxon & Jacqueline
28.

Kane, The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Family Law Section (The North

Carolina State Bar), Number 8, March 1996, at 1, available
http://www.ncbar.com/lamp/legaluifsa.htm (last modified Mar. 18, 1996).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol2/iss2/9
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ment and allowed the custodial parent and dependents to stay in their
home state. 32 The 1968 revisions to URESA resulted in the Act being retitled as the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(RURESA).33

All states eventually accepted some form of URESA or
RURESA; however, problems remained.34 The two major shortcomings
were that URESA created multiple child support orders with support
obligations set at differing amounts in different states, and that URESA
required the involvement of courts.35 Court involvement excluded many
efficient administrative procedures, such as administrative wage withholdings, being developed by state legislatures.36 Congress identified
these shortcomings and established the U.S. Commission on Interstate
Child Support (the Commission) to work with the National Conference
of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) to draft a new
model Act, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) to replace URESA and RURESA.3 7
In 1992 the Commission recommended to Congress that each
state be required to adopt UIFSA.3" Subsequently, Congress mandated
that states enact UIFSA to remain eligible for the federal funding of
child support enforcement. 39 At the request of Congress, but prior to the
mandate, Wyoming repealed URESA and adopted UIFSA in 1995. 40
Organized into eight articles, UIFSA provides procedural and jurisdictional rules for essentially three types of interstate child support

34.

UIFSA Handbook, supra note 10 at 1-1.
Id.
Id. at 1-1, 1-2.

35.

Id. At 1-2.

32.
33.

36. Id. Two other shortcomings were the lack of uniformity with respect to the
versions of URESA enacted by different states and the ability of responding states to
modify support orders previously entered by other states. John Saxon & Jacqueline
Kane, The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Family Law Section (The North
Carolina State Bar), Number 8, March 1996, at 3, available at
http://www.ncbar.com/lamp/legal_uifsa.htm (Mar. 18, 1996).
UIFSA Handbook, supra note 10 at 1-2.
38.
Id.
39.
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Prefatory Note, at 2 (1996), [hereafter
UIFSA].
40.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-101 to 20-4-138 (LexisNexis 2001). Repealed by
Laws 1995, ch. 148, §3. 42 U.S.C. Section 666(f) states on or after January 1, 1998 each
state must have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The Wyoming
Legislature, using 42 U.S.C. § 666(f), approved the UIFSA statutes patterned on the
model act with only minor variations.
37.
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proceedings: establishment, enforcement and modification of child support orders.4 '
Subject Matter Jurisdiction under UIFSA: Congressional Intent and
How Various States Have Interpretedthe Act
A court must have both subject matter and personal jurisdiction
to hear a case.42 Subject matter jurisdiction is the "extent to which a
court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status of things., 43 In
regard to subject matter jurisdiction, section 305 of UIFSA sets forth
twelve duties that a responding state court may complete after receiving
a petition from an initiating state.44 A court may issue or enforce support
orders, order income withholding, determine arrearages, hold parties in
civil or criminal contempt, order obligors to keep the court informed of
addresses and employers, issue bench warrants for failure to appear, order obligors to seek appropriate employment, award attorney fees, and
grant other available remedies.45
Wyoming Statutes section 20-4-155 lists verbatim eleven of the
model UIFSA's twelve duties and powers for a responding court.46 The
41.

See generally, UIFSA § 301 (b)(l-7) (1996).
(1) a proceeding to establish a child support order including:
a. an expanded means of obtaining personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident; and
b. establishing paternity, if necessary;
(2) a proceeding to enforce a child support order, including;
a. registering another state's order; and
b. enforcement without registration, including the use of incomewithholding orders; and
(3) a proceeding to modify a child support order.

Id.
42.
Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 496 (Wyo. 1998) "It is fundamental, if not
axiomatic, that, before a court can render any decision or order having any effect in any
case or matter, it must have subject matter jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is essential to the
exercise ofjudicial power. Subject matter jurisdiction, like jurisdiction over the person,
is not a subject of judicial discretion." Id.
43.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).
44.
UIFSA §305 (1996). A responding state means a state in which a proceeding is
filed or to which a proceeding is forwarded for filing from an initiating state under
UIFSA. UIFSA §101(16). An initiating state means a state from which a proceeding is
forwarded or in which a proceeding is filed for forwarding to a responding state under
UIFSA. UIFSA §101(9).
45.
See generally UIFSA §305(b) (1996).
46.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §20-4-155 (LexisNexis 2001). The only exception was that
Wyoming replaced income withholding with the ordering of medical support. The annotations or the legislative notes never state why the Wyoming Legislature changed the
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model UIFSA and the Wyoming version both clearly state "a responding
tribunal of this state may not condition the payment of a support order
issued under this act upon compliance by a party with provisions for
visitation. 4 7 UIFSA provides many congressional comments showing
the legislative intent. One particular comment states that under a UIFSA
action the petitioner generally is not present before the responding tribunal, and therefore visitation issues may not be litigated in the context of
a support proceeding.48
Prior to the adoption of UIFSA by various states, the Ohio Supreme Court had already decided that URESA did not give a state court
subject matter jurisdiction over custody and visitation rights in an interstate child support case.49 In In re Byrand v. Byler, the parties conceived
a child in 1987 in Ohio but the mother moved to Kentucky prior to the
child's birth. The mother filed a URESA petition for establishment of
paternity and child support with a Kentucky court, which forwarded the
petition to the Ohio Child Support Enforcement Agency.5 ' The Ohio
lower court established paternity and ordered child support, but also addressed visitation by designating the mother as the primary custodian
and granting the father reasonable visitation rights. 2 After the order was
issued, the father complained of denied visitation and was granted a
hearing.53 The mother responded with a motion to dismiss, alleging that
the juvenile court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to order visitation rights under the Ohio URESA statutes.5 4 The court ruled against the
mother's motion to dismiss and she appealed the court's dismissal. 5" The
Ohio Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did have jurisdiction
over custody and visitation rights in a URESA action.56
The Ohio Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals, stating, "[i]n an action involving disputed child support that was initiated
pursuant to URESA, the court has no subject matter jurisdiction to consider visitation and custody matters. 5 7 The court also stated that the
holding is consistent with the requirement that "support issues and visistandard UIFSA language.
47.
UIFSA §305(d) (1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. §20-4-155(d) (LexisNexis 2001).
48.
UIFSA §305(d) cmts.
49.
In re Byard v. Byler, 658 N.E. 2d 735, 738 (Ohio 1996).

50.
51.

Id at 735-736.
Id at 736.

52.

53.

Id.
Id.

54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 737.
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tation and custody issues be determined separately from each other."' 8
The court referred to ten URESA jurisdiction cases from other states,
noting, "[o]ther jurisdictions are in accord with the holding that a petition filed pursuant to URESA does not confer jurisdiction for custody
and visitation issues." 59
In 1997, the Colorado Court of Appeals, Division Two relied on
the UIFSA comments in deciding In the Interest of R.L.H. by not allowing the extension of subject matter jurisdiction under UIFSA to visitation
and custody issues.60 The State of Nevada filed a UIFSA petition in
Colorado to determine parentage, child support, and arrearages for a
mother who lived and received welfare benefits in Nevada. 6' During the
62
proceedings, the father requested an order concerning parenting time.
The trial court reasoned that because a parentage determination pursuant
to UIFSA requires application of the Uniform Parentage Act, it had jurisdiction to decide the visitation. 63 However, the Court of Appeals reversed the court's decision, stating, "as the responding tribunal in a proceeding brought pursuant to UIFSA, the trial court's subject matter
ju64
risdiction does not extend to the determination of parenting time.
PersonalJurisdictionUnder UIFSA: Does UIFSA Subject the Petitioner
to PersonalJurisdictionin the Responding State?
Even if a court has subject matter jurisdiction, it must also have
personal jurisdiction over both parties.65 Personal jurisdiction requires
that a court have the legal authority to make decisions that directly affect
an individual. 66 UIFSA provides for personal jurisdiction over nonresi-

58.

Id.

Id. The ten other cases are Mississippi Dept. of Human Serv. v. Marquis (Miss
1993), 630 So. 2d 331; Hood v. Hood (1984), 146 Vt. 195, 499 A.2d 772; State ex rel.
Dewyea v. Knapp (1984), 208 Mont. 19, 674 P.2d 1104; England v. England (Minn.
1983), 337 N.W.2d 681; State ex rel. Hubbard v. Hubbard (1983), 110 Wis. 2d 683, 329
N.W. 2d 202; People ex rel. Meveren v. Larimer Dist. Court (Colo. 1982), 638 P.2d
1371; Moffat v. Moffat (1980), 27 Cal. 3d 645, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967; Hoover v. Hoover (1978), 271 S.C. 177, 246 S.E. 2d 179; Kline v. Kline (1976), 260 Ark.
550, 542 S.W. 2d 499.
60.
In the Interest of R.L.H., a Child and Concerning R.W.J., 942 P.2d 1386, 1389
(Colo. Ct App. 1997).
61.
Id. at 1387.
62.
Id. An order for parenting time is usually known as a visitation order, which
covers the dates and times that the non-custodial parent has the child(ren).
63.
Id.
64.
Id.
65.
UIFSA Handbook, supra note 10, at 3-LA-I.
66.
Id.
59.
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dents in Article 2 of the Act.67 In proceedings to establish, enforce, or
modify child support orders, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual under eight circumstances, including personal service within the state, submitting to jurisdiction and various
situations pertaining to time and money spent on the child.68
In a UIFSA action, the average petitioner usually files the petition for establishment, enforcement or modification of a child support
order in petitioner's home state if she can get personal jurisdiction over
the respondent. If the order is from the petitioner's home state then
she/he can interact with the court that is going to handle all of the child
support issues. However, if none of the circumstances under which personal jurisdiction can be exercised exist, the child support petition can
be forwarded to the respondent's state of residency. 69
UIFSA authorizes the responding state to determine parentage;
however, the responding tribunal's authority under UIFSA to determine
parentage and establish a child support obligation does not confer jurisdiction for the court to consider parenting issues such as custody and
visitation.7" Due to distance and economic circumstances, the petitioner
in a UIFSA action is generally not present before the court. Even though
both parentage and visitation involve the same parties, they are separate
67.
UIFSA § 201 (1996).
68.
Id. [A] tribunal may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual
under eight circumstances:
(1)The individual is personally served ....
within the state.
(2) The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this State by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the
effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction.
(3) The individual resided with the child in this State;
(4) The individual resided in this State and provided prenatal expenses or
support for the child;
(5) The child resides in this State as a result of the acts or directives of the
individual;
(6) The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this State and the child
may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
(7) The individual asserted parentage in the putative father registry maintained in this State by the appropriate agency; or
(8) There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this State and
the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Id.
69.
UIFSA § 203 (1996). "Under this [Act], a tribunal of this State may serve as an
initiating tribunal to forward proceedings to another State and as a responding tribunal
for proceedings initiated in another State." Id.
70.
In the Interest of R.L.H., a Child and Concerning R.W.J., 942 P.2d 1386, 1389
(Colo. Ct App. 1997).
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issues and congressional comments to UIFSA suggest they should be
handled in two different proceedings. 7' Thus, UIFSA specifically provides limited immunity to the petitioner in regard to personal jurisdiction
by permitting a petitioner to appear before a responding tribunal with
jurisdiction limited to the establishment, enforcement, and modification
of child support.72
Various state supreme court decisions have also interpreted child
support and custody acts to separate visitation and child support. In
Early v. Early, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the state where the
child support order was entered had continued jurisdiction over child
support issues but under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(UCCJA), the state where the child was located had jurisdiction over
71
matters of child custody and visitation.
An Arkansas case, Office of Child Support Enforcement v.
Clemmons, illustrates the intent of UIFSA in determining child support
and collateral matters such as visitation in separate proceedings.7 4 In
Clemmons, the mother who was receiving welfare benefits assigned to
the State of Missouri her rights to child support arrearages. 75 After locating the father in Arkansas, the State of Missouri initiated an interstate
action to enforce his child-support obligation. 6 The chancellor entered
an order estopping the mother from obtaining a judgment and/or attempting to collect any child-support arrearages because the mother had willfully concealed the child from his father. 77 The Arkansas Court of Appeals held that "the chancellor may not consider collateral matters, including visitation, when faced with the issue of enforcement of child
support under this uniform act [UIFSA]."0' The court was clear that visi71.

UIFSA § 305 cmts. (1996).

72.

WYO. STAT. ANN. §20-4-164(a)(LexisNexis 2001); UIFSA § 314(a)(1996).

The comments to §314 state "The primary object of this prohibition is to preclude joining disputes over child custody and visitation with the establishment, enforcement, or
modification of child support." UIFSA § 314 cmts. (1996).
Early v. Early, 499 S.E. 2d 329, 330 (Ga. 1998). The father wanted to modify
73.
the Georgia Child Support Order in California, where the mother and child lived. Id. at
329. The father still lived in Georgia. Id. The California court would not grant jurisdic-

tion since the Georgia court still had jurisdiction over the child support order. Id. The
Georgia court stated the California court only had jurisdiction over child custody and
visitation issues. Id at 330.
Office of Child Support Enforcement v. Clemmons, 984 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ark.
74.
Ct. App. 1999).
75.
Id. at 839.
Id.
76.
77.
Id.
Id. Arkansas enacted UIFSA in 1993, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-17-101 et seq.
78.
(Lexis 1999).
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tation and child support under UIFSA are totally separate proceedings:
In a UIFSA action, visitation issues are collateral matters
which burden the child-support determination and run
counter to the goal of streamlining the proceedings both
procedurally and substantively .... [T]he chancellor directly contravened UIFSA's purpose of enforcing the
collection of child support. Because UIFSA does not allow us to consider the visitation issue, we must reverse.79
In Perdomo v. Fuller,an unusual situation arose when an alleged
father living in Oklahoma filed a UIFSA action to establish paternity
against a Wisconsin woman in the Oklahoma court system.80 The Oklahoma court denied his petition upon request from the mother on grounds
it was not the best forum to determine child support and the collateral
issues."1 The Oklahoma court stated:
Although the Act has attempted to deal with many of the
problems associated with interstate lawsuits, we are
nonetheless reluctant to disturb an Oklahoma tribunal's
(the lower court) declination of jurisdiction pursuant to
the Act. According to plaintiff, more is at stake in this
lawsuit than simply asking for blood tests. We agree with
the trial court that Wisconsin, the state where the mother
is a citizen and child has always resided, is8 2the more
convenient forum to hear this paternity action.
Do Welfare Benefits and the Child Support Agency Force a Custodial
Parentto Submit to PersonalJurisdiction?
In 1974 Congress amended the Social Security Act requiring
states to establish the Child Support Enforcement Program in order to
receive federal funding.83 Section 307 of UIFSA lists the duties of the
Child Support Enforcement Agency, which include providing services to
a mother or father in a proceeding under UIFSA.8 4 A mother or father
may voluntarily choose to apply for the services of the Child Support
79.

Clemmons, 984 S.W. 2d at 839.

Perdomo v. Fuller, 974 P.2d 185, 186 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
80.
Id. The Oklahoma court stated the best location for the action would be where
81.
the mother and child were located due to the effect on the hearing on the child. Id. at
186-187.
Id at 187.
82.
83.
Flores v. Flores, 979 P.2d 944, 946 (Wyo. 1999).
UIFSA § 307(a) (1996).
84.
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Offices. However, if a parent receives AFDC or Medicaid assistance,
they are required by law to cooperate with the Child Support Enforcement (CSE) program. 85 Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
AFDC, is a federally funded program created to provide financial assis-

tance to needy families with children.86 Both Wyoming and Nebraska
participate in the federally funded AFDC program and have child sup-

port enforcement programs.87 In order for a state to receive a block grant
to administer the AFDC program, it must certify it is operating a child
support enforcement program that includes enforcing support obliga-

tions, locating noncustodial parents, establishing paternity and obtaining
child and spousal support. 8

Many AFDC recipients must submit themselves to the jurisdiction of a responding state's courts if they want to continue to receive
welfare benefits. An AFDC recipient must assign the support rights to
the state for the period the AFDC recipient is receiving AFDC benefits.8 9
The federal standards for the child support enforcement program include
naming all of the potential parents of the child for whom aid is requested
and for the welfare recipient to provide as much known information to

assist in locating him/her, such as past addresses, phone numbers, social
security numbers for the noncustodial parent as well as his/her parent's

address. 90 The federal code has added sanctions to AFDC recipients in
85.
CD-ROM: An Introduction to the Child Support Enforcement Program, Module
1, page 14, (Policy Studies, Inc. 1996) [hereafter CD-ROM]; State Plan for State of
Wyoming, Aid for Dependant Children at 7, pursuant to 45 CFR 200, "Cooperation with
assignment of support, establishment of paternity, and pursuit of child support must
continue during any performance period to be eligible to receive a performance payment. The child support unit must immediately report noncompliance with these standards to the eligibility worker." Id.
86.
42 U.S.C.A. § 601(1999). (a) The purpose of this part is to increase the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to:
Provide assistance to needy families. 42 U.S.C.A. § 601(a)(l) (Supp. 2001).
87.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4-1-101 to 42-2-404 (LexisNexis 2001); NEB. REV.
STAT. §§ 43-501 to 43-536 (Michie 1998).
88.
42 U.S.C.A. § 602(a)(2) (Supp. 2001). "Certification that the state will operate
a child support enforcement program. A certification by the chief executive officer of
the state that, during the fiscal year, the state will operate a child support enforcement
program under the state plan approved under Part D." Id.
89.
42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a) (1999). §608(a) directs each State's Plan for TANF to
make mandatory "Cooperation with assignment of support, establishment of paternity,
and pursuit of child support must continue during any performance period to be eligible
to receive a performance payment. The child support unit must immediately report
noncompliance with these standards to the eligibility worker." Wyoming State Plan
Document, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families and Personal Opportunities with
Employment
Responsibilities
(POWER)
(2000)
at
7,
available at
http://dfsweb.state.wy.us/STATEPLN/stplanf2.htm (last modified July 14, 2000).
90.
CD-ROM, supra note 85, Module 1 at 14.
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the form of a reduction or elimination of assistance for not cooperating
in the establishment of paternity and obtaining of child support unless
good cause is established. 91
What is the Standardfor "the Best Interest of a Child?"
Even if a court has personal and subject matter jurisdiction to
decide issues of visitation and custody in an UIFSA action, the court is
still required to consider the best interests of the child. The Wyoming
Legislature and the Wyoming Supreme Court have both addressed the
standard for what is the best of interests of a child when addressing jurisdiction questions regarding visitation and custody issues.92 The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) incorporates this standard
in its framework. 93 Wyoming Statutes section 20-5-104 (a)(ii) states "it
is in the best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because the child ...ha[s] a significant connection with the state
and there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection, training and personal relationships., 94 This provision expressly relates to child custody issues and not
to child visitation, but the two situations are analogous. Both involve the
time a child spends with a noncustodial parent.
There are multiple cases addressing which court should have jurisdiction over visitation and custody issues and focusing on what is in
the best interest of the child. In Paternity of CarlinL.S. v. Neal, a paternity suit was filed by the child's mother against the father in Wisconsin. 95 The child was born in Minnesota and resided in Wisconsin, while
the father at the time of filing was a resident of Michigan. 96 The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that UCCJA did not by itself establish jurisdiction in the paternity action.97 The court ruled that if UIFSA
incorporates UCCJA, the UCCJA must be reviewed to determine if it

91.

42 U.S.C.A. § 608(a) (1999). Good cause can be granted if a history of mental

or physical abuse is shown or a potential threat of physical or mental harm or kidnapping is shown. Id.'
92.
WYO STAT. ANN. § 20-5-104(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001); Weller v. Weller, 960
P.2d 493, 495 (Wyo. 1998).

93.

WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-5-101 to 20-5-125 (LexisNexis 2001). These sections

of the Wyoming Statutes are known as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. Id
at §20-5-101.
94.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-5-104(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001).
95.
Paternity of Carlin L.S. v. Neal A.R., 593 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Wis. Ct. App.
1999).
96.
Id.
97.
Id. at 490.
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provides for jurisdiction." This indicates that a court must satisfy the
requirement of the UCCJA, which is to consider the best interest of the
child, to take jurisdiction over custody and visitation.
In Weller v. Weller the entire family lived in Pennsylvania until
the parents separated. 99 After the separation, the mother moved the child
to Wyoming and filed for divorce, including child support and custody
issues."'0 The father was served with a complaint in Pennsylvania but
failed to respond; consequently, a Wyoming court issued a default divorce decree that included custody and child support provisions.10 1 Later,
the father filed a custody complaint in Pennsylvania and then filed a motion in Wyoming to set aside the child custody and support provisions of
the divorce decree. 0 2 The district court upheld the custody and support
provisions but the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed.' °3 The court held
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the
UCCJA; therefore, the child custody and support provisions of the divorce decree were void.' 4 The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
district court did not obtain subject matter jurisdiction under UCCJA
because the petition was filed only two months after the mother and
child moved to Wyoming, and UCCJA subject matter jurisdiction rules
state that the child's "home state" has sole jurisdiction over custody and
support issues to protect the best interest of the child.' 05
The Wyoming Supreme Court also decided in Quenzer v. Quenzer that the best interests of a child is to be decided in the "home state"
of the child.106 The court referred to the UCCJA in stating "courts which
have interpreted this provision similarly have held that by requiring optimal access to the relevant evidence the best interest of the child will be
served. 10 7 The court found the best interests of the child are served

Id. at 489.
99.
Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493, 494 (Wyo. 1998).
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 496.
104.
Id. at 496.
105.
Id. The "home state" is where the child has lived for the last six consecutive
months which is Pennsylvania in this case. Id at 495. The Weller court state "Although
it would be judicially efficient to approve the district court's actions and order because,
at this point, the children have been in Wyoming for longer than six months, such an act
would undermine the legislative function, the purposes behind the UCCJA jurisdictional
requirements, and the basic doctrine of subject matter jurisdiction." Id at 496.
106. Quenzer v. Quenzer, 653 P.2d 295, 304 (Wyo. 1982).
107.
Id.
98.
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when the court with the best access to the evidence to decide
such sensi10 8
jurisdiction.
given
is
visitation
and
custody
as
tive issues
The Wyoming Supreme Court again addressed what constitutes
the best interests of a child in Thomas v. Thomas.1 9 In Thomas, the father and mother were married at the time of their daughter's birth. 0 The
father disappeared when the daughter was three months old.' The
mother obtained a default divorce decree, which included child support
provisions.112 The father was later located by the Wyoming child support
enforcement office and brought to court for failure to pay child support. 13 The district court dismissed the child support provisions due to
lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that "personal service was not obtained on the defendant prior to the entry of a child support obligation."'1 14 However, the father later filed a motion to establish visitation
and child support." 5 The district court stated in relevant part "the
[d]efendant has entirely failed to maintain contact with or interest in
[his] daughter ... The [d]efendant's history, [of] disappearing for a significant time ... [and] failure to provide support, indicates that the court

should be cautious in forcing visitation on daughter."1' 16 The district
court determined that it was in the daughter's best interest to grant the
father only limited visitation." 7 The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed
the ruling.
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Ostermiller,the district court granted Scott Spurr's request for
a change to BRO's surname and standard visitation by ruling it had jurisdiction over all issues." 8 Teresa Ostermiller, who was not present at
the district court hearing, appealed." 9 On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme
Court construed Wyoming's UIFSA and parentage statutes to hold, three
to two, that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
over the
1 20
visitation issue and personal jurisdiction over Teresa.
108.
109.
110.

Id.

111.

Id.
Id.

112.

Thomas v. Thomas, 983 P.2d 717, 718 (Wyo. 1999).
Id.

113.
114.

Id.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Id. at 719.
Id. at 722.
Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940,942 (Wyo. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 944.

Id.
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Jurisdiction-SubjectMatter and Personal
The court ruled that the Wyoming UIFSA statutes incorporate,
by reference, Wyoming's parentage statutes for paternity and support
proceedings, and provide for independent powers and jurisdiction of
Wyoming courts as responding tribunals.121 The court referred to Wyoming Statutes section 20-4-185 (part of the UIFSA statutes), which
states that in a parentage proceeding by a responding Wyoming tribunal,
the provisions of Wyoming Statutes sections 14-2-101 through 14-2-120
(the Parentage and Paternity action statutes) and the Wyoming choiceof-law provisions shall apply. 2 2 The court, in following the chain of
statutes, focused on Wyoming Statutes section 20-4-142 which provides:
(a) In a proceeding to establish a support order or to determine parentage, a district court of this state may
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident if:

(ii) The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this
state by consent,

(vii)The individual asserted parentage in this state
pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 through 14-2-120.
The court then looked at Wyoming Statutes section 14-2-113 to justify
the inclusion of visitation and name change. 23 Wyoming Statutes section
14-2-1 13 states:
(a) The judgment or order of the court determining the
exercise or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative for all purposes.
(b) If the judgment or order of the court is at variance
with the child's birth certificate, the court shall order that
a new birth certificate is issued.
(c) The judgment or order may contain any other provision directed against the appropriate party to the proceeding concerning the duty of support, the custody and

122.

Id. at 942.
Id. at 942-43.

123.

Id. at 943.

121.
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guardianship of the child, visitation privileges with the
child or
any other matter in the best interest of the
12 4
child.
The Wyoming Supreme Court used this trilogy of Wyoming statutes to
determine that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to determine parentage and to order custody, support, and visitation.121
The court, in regards to personal jurisdiction, held that because
Teresa submitted to Wyoming jurisdiction for adjudication of paternity
and child support by signing the child support petition she had submitted
to the same jurisdiction for the father's visitation and name change requests. 26 The court stated there is "no evidence in the record to support
a contention of involuntariness or coercion with respect to the mother's
signature on the petition initiated by Nebraska's child support enforcement agency"' 27 The court's justification for the ruling was based on
Quenzer v. Quenzer, which held that a party's demand for affirmative
relief changes a special
appearance to a general appearance that cannot
28
later be withdrawn.
Teresa further asserted that even if the district court had jurisdic29
tion, it abused its discretion in applying its "standard" visitation order.
The Wyoming Supreme Court based its ruling for standard visitation on
the fact that Scott Spurr and his wife were present for the hearing, Scott
was capable of providing care for the child, his wife was highly supportive of the parent-child relationship, and they desired a relationship with
the child. 3 0 However, Teresa appeared only through counsel and failed
to provide testimony to contradict Scott's statements. 3 ' The Wyoming
Supreme Court, reviewing the uncontradicted testimony, determined the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded standard
visitation to Scott Spurr. 32 The majority stated that the court
not only
33
had the authority but the obligation to determine visitation.

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-113 (LexisNexis 2001).
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 943.
Id. at 942.
Id. at 943.
Id at 942.
Id.
Id. at 943.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 944.
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PrincipalCase: Dissent
The dissenting opinion by Justice Golden, joined by Chief Justice Lehman, stated the district court did not have subject matter
jurisdiction over issues of custody, visitation, name change or income
tax deduction because UIFSA and the predecessor Acts clearly state that
34
subject matter jurisdiction is limited to parentage and support issues.1
The dissent, referring to the very similar Colorado paternity case In re
R.L.H., stated, "a determination of custody or visitation issues is noticeably absent from the list of duties and powers delineated in Section
14-5-305, C.R.S. (1996 Cum. Supp.), the statutory section of the Colorado UIFSA. 1 35 The dissent looked at the language of UIFSA, which
states "the power to assert jurisdiction over support issues under the Act
does not extend the tribunal's jurisdiction to other matters.' 3 6 The dissent discussed why visitation issues should be excluded in interstate paternity actions, stating, "this case [Ostermiller] provides an excellent
example of the need to determine other issues involving the child in the
child's home state. The record 'is37 absolutely devoid of any evidence as to
the best interests of the child."'
The dissent also addressed the issue of who was representing the
"best interests of the child" in this paternity action. 1 8 Wyoming statutes
provide that a child must be made a party to a paternity action and a
court-appointed attorney must represent the child.1 39 The State of Wyoming represented the child in the district court matter, but during the
appeal failed to represent the child and became an appellee.1 40 The dis134.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting) (citing In the Interest of R.L.H., a Child and Concerning R. W.J. at 1388-89).
135.
Id. at 945 (Golden, J., dissenting).
136.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
137.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
138.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
139.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-107 (LexisNexis 2001):
The child shall be made a party to the action. If the child is not represented
by a state agency and the child is a minor, the child shall be represented by
the child's guardian or a guardian ad litem appointed by the court for the limited purpose of establishing paternity. The child's mother or father may not
represent the child as guardian or otherwise.

Id.
140.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed concern "the court commissioner's statement that the State of Wyoming represented the child in this matter, yet the
State of Wyoming is the appellee in this appeal and the child is one of the appellants,
along with his mother. The parties to an action and their relationship to each other are
important matters, as this case illustrates through its apparent disregard for appropriate
captions on the filed petitions and the resulting confusion concerning personal jurisdic-
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sent questioned who was looking out for the best interest of the child by
stating,
it is unconscionable that decisions on such important issues concerning this child were made without any testimony or evidence about the child. The commissioner,
and hence the district court, relied upon comments from
a father who had never seen or spoken to his child and
attorneys who had never had contact with the child. I am
convinced that this illustrates the reasoning behind the
limited subject matter jurisdiction
given to a responding
41
tribunal under UIFSA.1
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court failed, both procedurally and substantively, in Ostermiller: The court procedurally failed to properly apply the guidelines and intent of UIFSA in finding that the state district
court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and substantively
failed to determine the best interests of the child, BRO.
Failureto Apply the CorrectJurisdictionalStandards
The majority opinion relied heavily on statutory language in determining that the district court had jurisdiction over custody and visitation rights. The court focused specifically on the Wyoming version of
142
UIFSA.
The Wyoming Supreme Court erroneously applied Wyoming
Statutes section 20-4-142 in authorizing the district court jurisdiction.
143
Wyoming's UIFSA statutes refer to Wyoming's parentage statutes.
However, the language in the Wyoming parentage statutes does not grant
authority to establish jurisdiction. Wyoming Statutes section 14-2-106
merely states, "the district court has jurisdiction of an action brought
under this act [Wyoming parentage statutes]. ' 44 The court erred in aption, parties, legal representation, and parties on appeal." Id.
141.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
142.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-139 to 20-4-189. (LexisNexis 2001).
143.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-142 (LexisNexis 2001).
(a) In a proceeding to establish ... a support order or to determine parentage, a district
court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident .. . if:
(vii) The individual asserted parentage in this state pursuant to W.S. 14-2-101 through
14-2-120.
144.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-106 (LexisNexis 2001). The statute also states a
person who has sexual intercourse in Wyoming which has resulted in the birth of a child
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plying the jurisdiction granted in the Wyoming parentage statutes because Teresa brought her UIFSA action under the145Wyoming UIFSA statutes, not under the Wyoming parentage statutes.
In determining if the court has jurisdiction, the court must consider under which statute the action was filed. Ostermiller did not fall
within the jurisdiction granted under the Wyoming parentage statutes
because the action was not brought under Title 14, but instead under
UIFSA.146 The court is granted subject matter jurisdiction for proceedings brought under a UIFSA action in Wyoming Statutes section 20-4151.147 The UIFSA statute is silent about visitation and custody proceedings and therefore does not explicitly provide the court with subject matter jurisdiction over visitation and custody proceedings. 148 The Wyoming
Supreme Court used Wyoming Statutes section 20-4-142 to hold that the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Teresa in the visitation
and custody proceedings. 49 Since Wyoming Statutes section 20-4-142
refers to the parentage statutes, the court held that Wyoming Statutes
section 14-2-113 gives the district court jurisdiction in the custody and
visitation proceedings.1 50 However, Wyoming Statutes section 14-2-106
who is subject of the proceedings under this act, subjects to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this state in an action brought under this act. Id. at (b). As well as, any action may be
brought in the county in which the child resides, is found or, if the father is deceased, in
which proceedings for probate of his estate have been or could be commenced. Id. at (c).
145. Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 941.
146.
Id.
147. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-151(b) (LexisNexis 2001) provides:
(b) The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act provides for the following
proceedings:
(i) Establishment of an order for ... child support...;
(ii) Enforcement of a support order and income withholding order of
another state without registration... ;
(iii) Registration of an order for ...child support of another state for enforcement ... ;

(iv) Modification of an order for child support.., issued by a district
court of this state ... ;
(v) Registration of an order for child support of another state for modi
fication ... ;

(vi) Determination of parentage.
148.
In the Interest of R.L.H., a Child and Concerning R.W.J., 942 P.2d 1386, 138889 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

149.

Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 943.

150.

Id.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-113 (LexisNexis 2001) reads:

(a) The judgment or order of the court determining the existence or nonexistence of the parent and child relationship is determinative of all purposes.
(b) If the judgment or order of the court is at variance with the child's birth
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is the section that gives the court jurisdiction under the Wyoming parentage statutes. It states, "the district court has jurisdiction of an action
brought under this act. The action may be joined with an action for divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, support or any action which
may affect the parent and child relationship."'' The action that Teresa
brought was under the UIFSA statutes and therefore, the UIFSA statute
should be controlling. The Wyoming parentage statutes are very clear
that in order to gain jurisdiction utilizing these statutes, the cause of action must invoke them in the first place. An action brought under the
Wyoming parentage statutes could be joined to a UIFSA action if the
original action or counterclaim was brought under the Wyoming parentage act. However, the original action and the counterclaim were brought
under the UIFSA statutes and therefore, do not grant jurisdiction by j oining the two statutes.
The UIFSA statutes refer to the Wyoming parentage statutes in
their entirety. The Wyoming parentage statutes, therefore, cannot be
completely ignored, which creates some confusion in how to determine
jurisdiction in UIFSA actions. The confusion can be attributed to the
reference of the Wyoming parentage statutes in the UIFSA statutes.
Since the UIFSA statute's language is not obvious in the meaning of the
words employed, extrinsic aids of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history, should be used. 152 The legislative intent of Congress in
passing UIFSA is explicit in the corresponding comments. Comments to
section 201 of UIFSA state, "nonresident party concedes personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative relief or by submitting to the jurisdiction
by answering or entering an appearance. However, the power to assert
jurisdiction over a support issue under the Act does not extend the tribunal's jurisdiction to other matters.' 5 3 The legislative intent clearly demonstrates that UIFSA is limited to support and parentage issues and spe54
cifically excludes other matters.1
certificate, the court shall order that a new birth certificate be issued.
(c) The judgment or order may contain any other provision directed against
the appropriate party to the proceeding concerning the duty of support, the
custody and guardianship of the child, visitation privileges with the child or
any other matter in the best interest of the child.

151.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-106 (LexisNexis 2001). The original action was a
UIFSA action. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 3. The counterclaim filed by Scott
Spurr was brought in response to the UIFSA action and not under the Wyoming parentage act. Id. Therefore, the action was never brought under the Wyoming parentage act.
152.
Hill v. Value Recovery Group, 964 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Wyo. 1998).
153.
UIFSA § 201 Cmt. The primary focus in statutory interpretation is determining
the legislative intent. In the Matter of the Interest of WJH, 24 P.3d 1147, 1150 (Wyo.
2001).

154.

UIFSA §201 Cmt. In reference to subsection 2.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2002

21

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 2 [2002], No. 2, Art. 9

610

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 2

The following case provides additional support for the view that
the Wyoming court's jurisdiction did not extend to name change and
visitation isses. The Colorado case, In the Interest of R.L.H., was also a
UIFSA action. Colorado had also adopted a UIFSA statute which included a reference to the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA).'5 5 The issue
presented was whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to
enter orders concerning parenting time in proceedings brought under
UIFSA. 5 6 R.L.H.'s father requested an order concerning parenting time
as Scott Spurr did in Ostermiller. 57 The district court in R.L.H. used the
same reasoning as the Wyoming court in that UIFSA requires application of the Uniform Parentage Act and therefore allows the court to de158
termine parenting time.
The similarities end with the analysis at the appellate level. The
Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's holding that because "the reference to the UPA in the Colorado UIFSA simply establishes a method to determine parentage ... as the responding tribunal in
a proceeding brought pursuant to UIFSA, the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction does not extend to the determination of parenting time.' ' 9
The Colorado Court of Appeals referred to a similar case from
Ohio. In In re Byard v. Byler the Supreme Court of Ohio stated, "no provisions in Ohio's URESA grants the court subject matter jurisdiction
over a disputed matter other than child support ....In an action involving disputed child support that was initiated pursuant to URESA, the
court has no subject matter jurisdiction to consider visitation and custody
matters."' 6 Even though Byard involves URESA, as predecessor to
UIFSA, it should be noted that the Ostermiller dissent stated, "the replacement of URESA and RURESA by UIFSA did not expand the permissible scope of issues to be addressed in interstate child support enforcement proceedings.' ' 1 Wyoming, along with other states, has used
the UCCJA to determine custody and UIFSA to determine child support,
which provides
a better approach when both support and visitation issues
62
are raised. 1
155.
In the Interest of R.L.H., a Child and Concerning R.W.J., 942 P.2d 1386, 1387
(Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
156.
Id.
157.
Id.
158.
Id. Parenting time is more commonly known as visitation.
159.

Id.

160.

In re Byard v. Byler, 658 N.E.2d 735, 737 (Ohio 1996).
Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940,944 (Wyo. 1998).
162.
Paternity of Carlin L.S. v. Neal A.R., 593 N.W. 2d 486 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999);
Weller v. Weller, 960 P.2d 493 (Wyo. 1998); Abu-Dalbouh v. Abu-Dalboth, 547 N.W.
161.
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Another state that separates visitation and child support matters
is Georgia. The law in Georgia is that a court's jurisdiction to hear an
interstate child support proceeding does not confer jurisdiction to hear
custody or visitation matters, which are governed by the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). 163 In general, the UCCJA confers
jurisdiction over custody issues in the child's "home state," which in
Ostermiller is Nebraska, not Wyoming. 64 The UIFSA statutes were intended to govern issues of paternity and child support and grant jurisdiction over these issues to the responding state. The UCCJA governs issues of child custody and visitation and grants jurisdiction to the child's
"home state." The Wyoming Supreme Court apparently ignored the
UCCJA when it recognized jurisdiction over visitation issues in Ostermiller.
Ostermiller is similar to Paternityof CarlinL.S. v. Neal in that it
referred to another statute for jurisdiction, not the UCCJA, but the
Wyoming parentage statutes.165 The Wisconsin court used the incorporated UCCJA statutes to assert jurisdiction, but in Ostermiller the court
did not attempt to use the Wyoming UCCJA statutes to gain jurisdiction.
Whether the court attempted to use the UCCJA is unclear since the court
was silent in regards to UCCJA. The Wyoming UIFSA statutes refer
only to the Wyoming parentage statutes; however, the Ostermillercourt
should not have had jurisdiction under the parentage statutes since the
original action was not filed under those statutes but under the UIFSA
statutes.
In a Wyoming case, Weller v. Weller, the court dealt with subject
matter jurisdiction under UCCJA. 166 The Wyoming Supreme Court ruled
that it must have subject matter jurisdiction in order to proceed with custody and visitation issues.1 67 As discussed earlier, the district court in
Ostermiller did not have jurisdiction over custody and visitation proceedings pursuant to the UIFSA statutes and the action was not filed
under the Wyoming parentage statutes. The Weller court stated "unless
the court has jurisdiction, it lacks any authority to proceed, and any decision, judgment, or other order is, as a matter of law, utterly void and of
no effect for any purpose."'' 68 Except for the issues of parentage and
2d 700 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
163.
Early v. Early, 499 S.E. 2d 329, 330 (Ga. 1998).
164. U.C.C.J.A. § 5, 9 (IA) U.L.A. 466 (1999).
165.
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 943 referring to Paternity of Carlin L.S. v. Neal A.R.,
593 N.W. 2d 486 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).

166.
167.
168.

Weller, 960 P.2d at 493.
Id. at 496.
Id.
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child support, the Ostermillercourt did not have subject matter jurisdiction and its decisions as to the collateral matters should be "utterly void
and of no effect for any purpose.' 6 9
In recognizing jurisdiction for custody and visitation, the Ostermiller court erroneously relied upon a 1982 Wyoming case, Quenzer v.
Quenzer, finding Ostermiller's paternity and child support claims were a
demand for affirmative relief which changed Teresa's appearance from a
special appearance to a general appearance. 70 Again, the Ostermiller
court failed to recognize that the interstate action was filed under a
UIFSA petition, while the Quenzer court based its jurisdiction on the
UCCJA, which allowed for jurisdiction over custody and visitation issues. 17 ' Therefore, the court should have never relied upon the Quenzer
case for analysis.
A welfare recipient or applicant may choose not to apply for
need benefits due to the potential for visitation and custody issues being
decided without their consent. The assertion of jurisdiction over visitation and custody issues collateral to a UIFSA proceeding subjects a nonresident petitioner to these other issues and therefore may dissuade the
nonresident custodial parent from ever filing an out-of-state petition under UIFSA in Wyoming. However, Teresa had to file the petition for
support and parentage or be removed from Nebraska AFDC support.
Teresa, like many welfare recipients, may have chosen to be removed
from ADFC support if she knew that she was subjecting herself to personal jurisdiction by filing the UIFSA action. The Ostermiller decision
sends a message to nonresident parents who may be forced into a UIFSA
action in Wyoming that the Wyoming court will also decide visitation
and custody. More importantly, most UIFSA petitioners will be unaware
of the Ostermiller decision and will blindly subject themselves to the
personal jurisdiction of the court to decide visitation and custody. Therefore, a UIFSA petitioner should be put on notice that by filing the peti169.

Id.

170.
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 942 (citing Quenzer, 653 P.2d at 295). Teresa
Ostermiller became a defendant in the counterclaim and challenged the jurisdiction of
the counterclaim for visitation. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 3. A common method
in state courts of challenging the court's personal jurisdiction is by making a "special
appearance." JACK FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE §3.26 (3d ed. 1999). A
defendant who wishes to object to personal jurisdiction must enter a special appearance
and typically is not permitted to introduce any other defenses prior to or simultaneously
with raising the objection which if done is deemed to be a "general appearance" and will
waive all jurisdiction objections. Id. Teresa presented her objection to personal jurisdiction to the counterclaim and therefore was not subjecting herself to a general appearance. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1,at 3.
171.
Quenzer, 653 P.2d at 298.
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tion they may be subjected to rulings on visitation and custody and can
choose not to file and lose their benefits.
The Ostermiller dissent stated, "this case provides an excellent
example of the need to determine other issues involving the child in the
child's home state."' 72 Teresa Ostermiller and the State of Nebraska
could not gain personal jurisdiction over Spurr on the issues of child
support and parentage and therefore sent the interstate petition to Wyoming to decide those issues. ' An Oklahoma case, Perdomo v. Fuller,
states "a court where the child resides may be in a better position to deal
with the collateral issues that plaintiff raises in his pleadings: support
and maintenance of the child and proper surname of the child."' 74 The
Perdomo court noted, the issues of visitation and custody would be best
decided in the home state of the child and the father could have submitted to jurisdiction in Nebraska.17 5 The Ostermiller court could have requested a transfer of the collateral issues to a Nebraska court.'76 As the
dissent stated, "If the respondent to a UIFSA action wishes to have other
172.
Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 945 (Golden J., dissenting).
173.
The State of Nebraska could not get long-arm jurisdiction over Spurr since none
of the following eight circumstances were available under the checklist for asserting
long-arm jurisdiction. NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-705 (Lexis 1999).
In a proceeding to establish, enforce, or modify a support order or to determine parentage, a tribunal of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident individual or the individual's guardian or conservator if:
I. The individual is personally served with notice within the State;

2. The individual submits to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having
the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;
3. The individual has resided with the child in this state;
4. The individual resided in this state and provided prenatal expenses or
support for the child;
5. The child resides in this state as a result of the acts or directives of the
individual;
6. The individual engaged in sexual intercourse in this state and the child
may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;
7. The individual asserted parentage in this state pursuant to section 43104.02, 71-628, 71-640.01, or 71-640.02 with the Department of Health
and Human Services Finance and Support; or
8. There is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of this state and
the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Id.
174.
Perdomo v. Fuller, 974 P.2d 185,187 (Okla. Civ. App. 1998).
175.
Perdomo, 974 P.2d at 187. If Spurr truly desired visitation with BRO, he only
lived 100 miles from the Teresa's hometown and could have easily and without much
cost filed the action in Nebraska and asserted himself to jurisdiction. Appellant's Brief,
supra note 2, at 2-3.
176.
Perdomo, 974 P.2d at 187.
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issues decided at the same time, the proper forum is the child's home
state, where determination as to the child's best interests may be properly decided through the use of competent evidence concerning the
child.'1 The usual argument for combining the UIFSA action with the
collateral issues of visitation and custody are judicial economy and efficiency. However, this argument overlooks the child's best interest that
should be the main focus of the court.
Were the Child's Best Interests Considered?
During the trial the father acknowledged that he had never visited his son because the two-hour drive was too far.' 7 The Ostermiller
court relied upon the facts in the record that the father was allegedly
capable of providing for the child, the wife was highly supportive and
the father wanted to enjoy a relationship with the child as justifying lib79
eral visitation of a child the father never met or attempted to meet.
Scott Spurr had almost three years to attempt to act like a father, but did
nothing until after the Uniform Child Support Petition had been filed. 80
No expert testimony, guardian ad litem reports, or input from the mother
were consulted before the order of visitation was entered., The record
lacks any showing that measures were taken to ensure the best interests
of the child such as home visits or supervised visitation.,8 2 In the case of
a father who has never seen his son, it is more logical to place specific
restrictions on the father before placing the child with him for an entire
weekend. Without adequate investigation, a litigant may in fact turn out
to be a violent, abusive, or ill-equipped father. At the very least a child
may be frightened of an unknown adult.
Why was the State of Wyoming Involved in the Appeal?
The Report of the District Court Commissioner and the Judgment and Order for Paternity and Support were captioned with the State
of Wyoming ex rel Teresa Ostermiller and Brent Ostermiller as the petitioners and Scott Spurr as the respondent. 8 3 Upon the adverse ruling,
177.
178.

Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 945 (Golden, J., dissenting).
Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.

179.

Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 943.

180.

Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.

181.
182.

Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 11.
Final Order, supra note 22 at 1-4. Usually home visits are conducted by the

Department of Family Services and consist of one or two visits to the home of parent to
view the living conditions.
183.
The caption in the Report of District Court Commissioner was STATE OF
WYOMING, ex rel, TERESA A. OSTERMILLER and BRETT OSTERMILLER, a
minor child vs. SCOTT SPURR. The caption of the Judgment and Order for Paternity
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Teresa appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court. The caption in the
Brief of Appellant was the same as the Report of District Court Commissioner. However, the Brief of Appellee had a movement of parties. The
State of Wyoming switched sides and became the Appellee and the captioned was changed to reflect that move. 8 4 The Wyoming1 6Attorney General's office filed the brief.. Scott Spurr filed no brief. 1
In the Report of District Court Commissioner, the Summary of
Evidence states, "the minor child was represented by the State of Wyoming as guardian ad-litem for the minor child in the paternity action."18 7
The Ostermiller dissent expressed concern "with the court commissioner's statement that the State of Wyoming represented the child in
this matter, yet the State of Wyoming is the appellee in this appeal and
the child is one of the appellants, along with his mother."' 8
The facts seem to confuse almost everyone who reads them. The
State of Wyoming was named as guardian ad-litem on behalf of BRO by
the district court. In addition, the State of Wyoming brought the original
interstate action on behalf of the State of Nebraska and Teresa Ostermiller and her son. The State of Nebraska never requested the State of
Wyoming to determine visitation and custody. The action was initiated
by the State of Nebraska by submitting a uniform interstate transmittal
form, which does not request visitation or custody. However, the State of
Wyoming decided to fight the Ostermillerappeal.
In light of all of these facts, the question of why the State of
Wyoming switched sides needs to be asked. This has the appearance of
an egregious conflict of interests. The Wyoming Department of Family
Services and the Wyoming Attorney General's office can best answer
that question.
CONCLUSION

Teresa Ostermiller and the State of Nebraska filed a UIFSA petition with the State of Wyoming to determine child support and parentand Support was State of Wyoming, Department of Family Services, State of Wyoming,
ex rel., TERESA A. OSTERMILLER, and BRETT R. OSTERMILLER, a minor vs.
SCOTT SPURR.
184.
The caption of the Brief of Appellee was TERESA A. OSTERMILLER, and
BRETT R. OSTERMILLER, a Minor Appellants v. SCOTT SPURR Appellee, STATE
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERICES, Appellee.
185.
Brief of Appellee, supra note 24, at 12. Signature of William U. Hill, Attorney
General for the State of Wyoming.
186.
Reply Brief of Appellant at 1, Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1998)
(No. C-97-219).
187.
Report of District Court Commissioner, supra note 16, at 1.
188.
Ostermiller v. Spurr, 968 P.2d 940, 945 (Wyo. 1998) (Golden, J., dissenting).
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age. 8 9 The Wyoming court which considered the petition did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the father's counterclaim for visitation
and name change since UIFSA does not give the court the power to determine visitation, custody or name change issues.' 9 In addition, Teresa
Ostermiller did not submit to personal jurisdiction in Wyoming by bringing the UIFSA action.19' However, even though the court lacked both
subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, it allowed the district court's order for visitation to stand. Finally, the court ignored its
own standards regarding the best interests of the child. Therefore, when
the Wyoming Supreme Court is presented with a similar case, it should
overturn this decision in order to protect the child's best interests and
follow UIFSA's intent.
MICHAEL LANSING

189.
190.
191.

Ostermiller, 968 P.2d at 941.
UIFSA § 305 cmts. (1996).
UIFSA § 314 cmts. (1996).
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